p239

An introduction to the frame problem : 

D. Dennett, “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI,” in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (edited by M. A. Boden, Oxford University Press, 1984, p147-170).

Meaning

‘Meaning’ is not the symbol sequence itself, but something that is carried by it. For the base sequence coding a histone or for a number sequence expressing pi, whether such a sequence is intrinsically meaningful in the absolute sense cannot even make sense as a qustion. We can say that the meaning of a sequence is worth discussing only when it is paired with a way to interpret it, a very natural statement. Here, ‘interpretation’ implies that a correspondence rule is given between the ‘world of sequences’ and the ‘actual world’ (See Chapter 4; this is just that there is an adaptor).

Discussion 5.1

The point is that there are things that require actual objects to define them and things that require not actual objects to define them. Things requiring actual objects are complex in the proper sense of this word. 

Footnote 7 addendu m ` emotional reaction is the intuitive form of  value judgment’

A related review is:

ChapmanIn Bad Taste: Evidence for the Oral Origins of Moral Disgust

Science  323 1222 (2009)

* Gustatory distaste (unpleasant tastes), basic disgust (photographs of contaminants), and moral disgust (unfair treatment in an economic game) evoked activation of the levator labii muscle region of the face, characteristic of an oralnasal rejection response. 

The following paper is also related to `cleansing’:

Zhon et al., Washing Away Your Sins:  Threatened Morality and Physical Cleansing

Science  313 1451 (2006)

Daily hygiene routines such as washing hands can deliver a powerful antidote to threatened morality, enabling people to truly wash away their sins.

*How can you obtain such a conclusion? Participants are first asked to recall in detail either an ethical or unethical deed from their past and to describe any feelings or emotions they experienced. Then they engaged in a word completion task in which they converted word fragments into meaningful words (9). Of the six word fragments, three (W _ _ H, SH _ _ ER, and S _ _ P) could be completed as cleansing-related words (wash, shower, and soap) or as unrelated words (e.g., wish, shaker, and step). Participants who recalled an unethical deed generated more cleansing-related words than those who recalled an ethical deed.

However, if asked whether there is a proof for the assertion that ethical feeling is based on emotion (Hume’s idea), it is fair to say we have only circumstantial evidences:

Emotion gives only motivation for action judged moral by some other system? Rawlsian?

Huebner et al.,The role of emotion in moral psychology

Trends Cognitive Sci  13  1 (2009) 

*Despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. 

*The source of moral judgments lies in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a primary role in motivating morally relevant action.

*Behavioral data have four difficulties:

(i) these data fail to isolate the precise point at which emotion has a role in our moral psychology

(ii) these data fail to demonstrate that emotion transforms conventional judgments into moral judgments.

(iii) there is little consistency in the scales used to measure the role of emotion in moral psychology

(iv) although emotion yields `practical’ judgments, it is unclear that this warrants treating emotion as constitutive of `moral’ judgments

In summary, current behavioral data fail to license the claim that emotional processes are the source of moral computation leading to judgment.

*Neural imaging data: the mere activity of neural circuits classically associated with emotion in processing moral scenarios fails to distinguish between the claim that (i) emotions are integral to moral computation and (ii) emotions result from these computations.

*We suggest instead (for more complete development, see Refs [15,16,51,60]) that our

moral judgments are mediated by a fast, unconscious process that operates over causal-intentional representations. The most important role that emotions might have is in motivating action.