p236

フレーム問題入門文献としてD. Dennett, “Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI,” in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (edited by M. A. Boden, Oxford University Press, 1984, p147-170).

意味

「意味」は記号列そでなくそれが担っている何かである.ヒストンをコードしている塩基配列にせよ,π を表現している数字列にせよ,それ自体として「絶対的に」意味があるかないかということは問題にもならない.たとえば, π を4進法で書き,0, 1, 2, 3 をこ順にA, T, G, Cで置き換えることによって長大なるDNAを作ることができる.これには意味があるか?ほとんど確実に生物学的に意味がない塩基配列になるだろう.ある記号列が意味があるかないかはそ読み方と読んだ結果を使う使い方が指定されないと問うことが出来ない.解釈しかたとセットになっているときみ記号列意味を云々することができる,と言ってもいい(至極当たり前ことに過ぎない).ここで,解釈とは「記号世界」を「実際世界」に(一義的に) 対応させる対応規則が与えられているということである(第4章参照; アダプターがあるということだ)

課題5.1.1 に関して.要点は「世中には定義するに実物が必要なもとそうでないもとがある.」ということであり,実物が必要なもがまともな意味で複雑なである.

脚注13補足「情動反応は価値判断直観形式である」

これに関係した論説

9 ChapmanIn Bad Taste: Evidence for the Oral Origins of Moral Disgust

S 323 1222 

*Gustatory distaste (unpleasant tastes), basic disgust (photographs of contaminants), and moral disgust (unfair treatment in an economic game) evoked activation of the levator labii muscle region of the face, characteristic of an oralnasal rejection response. 

多少関係した論文は「御祓い」にも関係している:

6 ZhongWashing Away Your Sins:  Threatened Morality and Physical Cleansing

S 313 1451

Daily hygiene routines such as washing hands can deliver a powerful antidote to threatened morality, enabling people to truly wash away their sins.

*How can you obtain such a conclusion? Participants are first asked to recall in detail either an ethical or unethical deed from their past and to describe any feelings or emotions they experienced. Then they engaged in a word completion task in which they converted word fragments into meaningful words (9). Of the six word fragments, three (W _ _ H, SH _ _ ER, and S _ _ P) could be completed as cleansing-related words (wash, shower, and soap) or as unrelated words (e.g., wish, shaker, and step). Participants who recalled an unethical deed generated more cleansing-related words than those who recalled an ethical deed.

ただし,道徳的感情が情動にそ基礎を置く(Hume考えかた)ということに証明があるか,といわれると状況証拠的なもしかないというは公平なところであろう.

Emotion gives only motivation for action judged moral by some other system? Rawlsian?

9 Huebner et al.,The role of emotion in moral psychology

TCS 13 1 

*Despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. 

*The source of moral judgments lies in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a primary role in motivating morally relevant action.

*Behavioral darta have four difficulties:

(i) these data fail to isolate the precise point at which emotion has a role in our moral psychology

(ii) these data fail to demonstrate that emotion transforms conventional judgments into moral judgments.

(iii) there is little consistency in the scales used to measure the role of emotion in moral psychology

(iv) although emotion yields `practical’ judgments, it is unclear that this warrants treating emotion as constitutive of `moral’ judgments

In summary, current behavioral data fail to license the claim that emotional processes are the source of moral computation leading to judgment.

*Neural imaging data: the mere activity of neural circuits classically associated with emotion in processing moral scenarios fails to distinguish between the claim that (i) emotions are integral to moral computation and (ii) emotions result from these computations.

*We suggest instead (for more complete development, see Refs [15,16,51,60]) that our

moral judgments are mediated by a fast, unconscious process that operates over causal-intentional representations. The most important role that emotions might have is in motivating action.